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ABSTRACT 
The study of professions has been dominated by Anglo-American models, with their focus on 
a small group of legally-licensed occupations. The field has recently shifted, mainly through 
studies of European experience, to a wider examination of the social management of expert 
workers. Very little has been written about developments in Africa and their implications for 
the way in which we might think about professions. This paper presents a case study of the 
role and practices of the medical profession in Burkina Faso, which has a relatively open 
market for the supply of healing services and limited regulation of the suppliers, whether 
physicians or traditional practitioners. The study returns to classic questions about the extent 
to which practice is shaped by the nature of occupational niches within the division of labour 
or to the development of a distinctive moral character among the workers within that niche?  
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been observed that the study of professions has been dominated by Anglo-
American models, with their focus on a small group of legally-licensed occupations (e.g. 
Rueschemeyer 1983). Attention has recently shifted, mainly through studies of European 
experience, to a wider examination of the social management of expert workers (Svensson 
and Evetts 2010. See also Gorman and Sandefur 2011). Very little has been written about 
developments in Africa and their implications for the way in which we might think about 
professions.  This paper uses a case study of the medical profession in Burkina Faso to 
examine the constitution of a niche within the division of labour and its implications for the 
moral practice of work within it. Is ‘professional’ behaviour a property of the niche or of the 
actors within it? The first section introduces the conceptual framework and methods of the 
study. The second, third and fourth sections describe the development of the niche for 
medical practice in Burkina Faso through the demand for, and supply of, legal, economic and 
cultural resources. The fifth section examines the implications of this commercially 
structured situation for the practice of medicine in Burkina Faso, and the wider lessons for the 
sociology of the professions.    
 
THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: STRUCTURE AND PRACTICE 
Early writings about the professions noted their emergence as a partial solution to the 
problems of trust created by the division of labour in the course of social and economic 
modernization. This created asymmetries of knowledge and expertise between members of 
society that could be highly consequential for individual and collective futures (Dingwall 
1995; 1999). How could experts be prevented from exploiting or abusing their structurally-
advantaged positions or monopolies? Could this outcome be achieved simply by the 
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evolutionary processes of the division of labour, and the nature of the occupational niches 
that they generated, or did it require special forms of governance?  
 
Adam Smith (1976), for example, was generally critical of guilds as a source of monopoly 
and market closure. Nevertheless, he saw the problems of trust, and consequent market 
failure, as sufficient justification for self-regulating professional associations in these areas. 
His position was echoed by Durkheim (1960) in Division of Labour. This book proposes a 
guild-like system of occupational associations as a way to limit potential abuses in 
unrestrained markets. Membership would be a source of moral constraint on the unbridled 
exercise of self-interest. Durkheim (1992) developed this theme, with a larger role for the 
state in supervising the system, in later lectures, published as Professional Ethics and Civic 
Morals. These lectures gave more emphasis to the internalization of a sense of civic 
obligation through the wider educational system and specific occupational or professional 
training. Professionals, and other workers, would literally find it unthinkable to abuse their 
market advantages. This line of argument was continued by Parsons (1939; 1951), discussing 
altruism as a restraint on self-interest in both professional and business occupations that 
contributed to the successful functioning of modern societies.  
 
In parallel, however, other sociologists continued to explore the structural questions about the 
division of labour established by Smith, and later by Herbert Spencer, in their evolutionary or 
ecological approaches (Dingwall 2016; Dingwall and King 1995). These focussed on 
understanding the dynamics of the process, the niches being created by social, economic and 
technological change, and the various attempts at colonizing them by different occupational 
groups (Hughes 1984; Abbott 1988). This approach tended to flatten the moral distinctions 
between professions and other occupations, who were all seen as self-interested and strategic 
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actors. In some hands (e.g. Freidson 1970; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977), this developed into a 
critique of professions as monopolies or cartels, using their expertise to capture the state and 
extract economic rents or status advantages from their position. While there were always 
empirical problems with this analysis (Rueschemeyer 1986; Johnson 1995; Light 1995; 
Dingwall 1995), it came to dominate throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It is still influential, 
although some advocates adopted a more nuanced view in later work (Dingwall 2006). The 
state was reintroduced as an independent actor such that professional monopolies were 
supplied to further state interests rather than simply being demanded to further occupational 
interests. The understanding of state interests varied from a concern to promote efficiency 
and effectiveness in publicly-funded ventures through a desire to survey and manage 
populations to an attempt to manage overload by dispersing sites of governance and citizen 
services. Professions also came to be seen as potential sources of moral resistance to 
inhumane or oppressive behaviour by state actors. This is, for example, a theme in Liu’s 
(2017) analysis of the legal profession in contemporary China, which examines its role as a 
mediator between state and market and its activism in relation to human rights.  
 
One of the consistent problems with this body of work has, though, been its limited empirical 
base. As Liu (2017: 213) notes: ‘Despite the fast-growing number of doctors, lawyers, 
engineers, economists, and many other professionals in developing countries, little effort has 
been made to theorize the relationship between professions and development in the Global 
South’. An African case study allows us to examine a situation where a medical profession 
based on allopathic principles has not, or not yet, achieved legal and cultural hegemony. 
Burkina Faso has a relatively open market for the supply of healing services and limited 
regulation of the suppliers, whether trained in the European tradition of allopathic (scientific) 
medicine or the traditional practices of the various communities to be found within the 
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country. Within such a context, it is easier to adopt the principle of symmetry derived from 
science and technology studies and to insist that all healing workers should be treated within 
the same analytic frame (Bloor 1991). A study of their relations with patients, states and 
markets should help us to disentangle some of the key propositions of the sociology of 
professions about the balance between altruism and self-interest in the practice of their craft. 
How does the ecological context interact with the normative stances traditionally considered 
to be distinctive to professional work? Is ‘professional’ behaviour a property of the niche or 
of the actors within it?  
 
We have, then, competing accounts of professional practice. Are disinterestedness and 
altruism the necessary consequence of internalized social structures, expressed in the talk and 
actions of licensed practitioners? Unlicensed practitioners are not able to behave in this way 
because they have not internalized the same structural model. They are positioned in a 
commercial sector where individual self-interest is said to be the internalized disposition. 
Traditional healers might be thought to serve their clients in their own interest, where medical 
doctors prioritize the interests of their clients, even in private practice. As Sciulli (2009: 200) 
notes, though, this may not adequately characterize practice in the commercial sector: “No 
one is prevented, certainly, from acting altruistically or selflessly”. The alternative is to see 
the expression of professional values as something that may characterize any occupation as 
part of its claims to be recognized as the legitimate owner of a bundle of tasks and to 
demarcate an ecological niche within the division of labour. The open market for health care 
in Burkina Faso offers a good case to test these rival accounts.   
 
Research Design and Methods 
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This study was designed to examine the ecology of healing work in Burkina Faso, a former 
French colony in West Africa. Rather than beginning with the prior categories of an official 
map of the division of labour, we chose to start from the work of healing, to ask who did it 
and how they were organized in more or less systematic ways. In doing so, we were adopting 
an approach outlined by Hughes (1984) and developed further by Freidson (1978; 1994. See 
also Dingwall 1983). This decouples the universe of work and the classification of 
occupations imposed upon it. In effect, Freidson challenged researchers to think about the 
principles upon which a taxonomy of occupations might be based. For him the key 
dimensions were the relationship between the tasks and the legitimate market economy: is the 
work paid or unpaid? Recognized as lawful or banned as criminal? Although Freidson places 
most emphasis on the economic and legal dimensions that lead an occupation to be officially 
recognized, it is clear from his discussion that there are potentially others. These certainly 
include cultural and symbolic dimensions: what work does a society consider appropriate to 
incorporate within the market? What rewards are offered other than the purely monetary, 
whether within or outside market transactions? These are clarified in Bourdieu’s influential 
discussion of varieties of capital (Bourdieu 1986: 243): economic which “refers to money or 
liquid assets”; social which denotes the possession of a “durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”; cultural which is 
acquired through the educational system; and symbolic which “denotes reputation and 
professional prestige’.1 
 
Data were gathered from the Archives de la Défense, in France; Archives Nationales du 
Senegal, in Dakar, and Archives Nationales du Burkina Faso, in Ouagadougou; from 
government documents on development and health policy; from court records of medical 
malpractice cases; and from legislation. In total, seventy-five interviews were carried out with 
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representatives of various stakeholders in health policy – government and civil service, 
NGOs, associations of both licensed medical practitioners and traditional healers, 
supplemented by observations of practice in both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ environments. 
The analysis mixed inductive and deductive elements with data coding derived partly from an 
inspection of the data and partly from specific questions derived from a review of the 
published literature. The data discussed here come from those codes dealing with the 
relationships between different types of healer and their patients, with the impact of legal 
frameworks on the practice of healing, and on the jurisdictional strategies pursued by healers. 
Our focus is on how various influences combine and interact to shape the niche occupied by 
allopathic doctors in Burkina and Faso and to promote, or discourage, behaviour that is 
professional in terms of its ethics, morality or integrity.  
 
THE LEGAL ORDER OF HEALTH CARE IN BURKINA FASO 
Freidson (1978) emphasized the legal and economic dimensions of a taxonomy of 
occupations. From independence in 1960 until the end of the 1980s, the official market for 
healing work in Burkina Faso was defined and dominated by the state, through legal acts. (In 
practice, most citizens actually used traditional healers operating in an informal market, 
whether as substitutes or complements for licensed allopathic medical practitioners.) The 
state derived political legitimacy from the free or heavily-subsidised provision of social 
services, including health care (World Bank 1990). While the state had assumed a legal 
responsibility to provide medications, in reality individuals still needed to buy them privately 
(Kaboré 2002). The role of the state declined through a number of coups d’état in the 1980s, 
which weakened the internal economy. This deterioration was initially covered by external 
borrowing, but failure to meet debt repayments led the country into a Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) from 1991. As is common with such programmes, economic reforms led 
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to significant transfers of functions, including health, from the state to the market. State 
expenditure on health care fell from 7 per cent of the national budget in 1991 to 4 per cent in 
1995 (Sawadogo 2012).  
 
Private provision of allopathic medicine had always existed in Burkina Faso. First practiced 
unofficially by French expatriates, it boomed after the 1991 market reforms, which supplied a 
legal framework for the private provision of health services. Medical practice was liberalized: 
different areas of professional practice were defined in the Public Health Code by law 
no.23/94/ADP of 19 May 1994. Hospital law no.034/98/AN/ of May 1998 organized the 
health system by defining the different categories of health services. Decree 
no.398/PRES/PM/MS of 19 July 2005, complemented respectively by the inter-ministry and 
ministerial by-laws no.2006/MS/MCPEA/MFB of 16 June 2006, no.200-060/MS/CAB, 
defined the conditions of professional licensing, and of the opening and operation of private 
health care centres.  
 
The emphasis on constructing a ‘modern’ state in the early years after independence meant 
that traditional medicine was relatively neglected in legal terms. Order no.70-68 
bis/PRES/MSP/AS of December 1970 formally tolerated the practice of traditional medicine 
(Bognounou and Guinko 2005:33). This space was enlarged in 1994 by law no.23/94/ADP on 
the Public Health Code which “recognises Traditional Medicine and Traditional 
Pharmacopeia as one of the components of the national health system” (Bognounou and 
Guinko 2005:34). Current estimates are that more than 80 per cent of the population uses 
traditional medicine at some time.  In 2010 it was thought that there were more than 30.000 
traditional healers in the whole country, including at least 600 in Ouagadougou, the capital.  
Marabouts, Muslim holy men, have been influential in the supply of healing services since 
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the pre-colonial period (Sawadogo 2012). Soubeiga (1999:111) also notes that “Apart from 
their traditional activities of evangelization, one of the common characteristics of Christian 
churches of different denominations established in Burkina Faso is that they appear more and 
more as places of care of illness”. Moreover, there is a sizeable but undocumented market in 
informal sales of prescription drugs in both rural and urban areas.  
 
The private provision of health services is relatively unregulated. They are legally considered 
to be commercial enterprises and treated as such by the tax system. Pricing and prescriptions 
are not controlled and there are no quality standards regarding facilities, equipment and 
personnel (Ouédraogo, 2010). The involvement of private actors in development aid, and 
their strong control of funding, displaced the state as a regulator in the field of health care, 
and then institutionalized profit motives as acceptable and even desirable. The weakening of 
state power created opportunities for citizens to engage with private agents to provide means 
of payment and actual services in parallel with, or replacing, those of the state. 
 
If we compare Burkina Faso with the countries traditionally studied by the sociology of the 
professions, we can, then, see that healing work is only loosely classified and regulated by the 
state through the supply of a legal order that might define officially-recognized niches. No 
particular group of providers has a clear structural advantage in the provision of services: 
there are few constraints on the supply of medicinal products and no notion of the unlicensed 
practice of medicine. This is a context within which providers have wide scope for self-
organization and self-regulation, should they see any collective advantage in doing so. There 
are few barriers to entry, other than those of building a reputation. The legal order does not 
specifically promote professional integrity. 
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THE ECONOMIC ORDER OF HEALTH CARE IN BURKINA FASO  
The shift from public to commercial models in the supply of health care redefined the 
economic dimension of occupational niches in two ways. One was the emergence of third 
party payers and the other was the reconstitution of patients as consumers rather than 
beneficiaries. This, however, only affected the small proportion of the population formally 
employed within the officially-recognized part of the economy. They had been covered by a 
social security system developed between 1970 and 1983 through legal instruments like Law 
n° 13/72 AN of 28/12/1972, which created the National Social Security Fund (Caisse 
Nationale de Sécurité Sociale) providing Family Benefits (Prestations Familiales), benefits 
for Work Accidents and Occupational Diseases (Accidents du Travail et Maladies 
Professionnelles-AT & MP) and Old Age Insurances (Assurances Vieillesse-AV). As of 2001, 
only 11 per cent of the population was covered by this mechanism, meaning that, like most 
neighbouring countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, 90 per cent of the population, working in 
informal sectors, were excluded (Bationo and Ouédraogo 2012; Ouédraogo 2012). The SAP 
moved the formally employed part of the population towards the position of the informally 
employed, with liability to pay individually for health care.  
 
However the state’s retreat from the funding of health care did not lead to a general increase 
in the power of consumers to influence the occupational niches and the actions of those 
claiming them. The majority of the population cannot afford health care from their own 
resources. Typically, costs are covered by informal means such as loans, dissolution of 
savings or the selling of essential resources (Bationo and Ouédraogo 2012). Initially, the state 
sought to assist by promoting cheaper forms of primary care, but it was under strong pressure 
to abandon any role in social protection in order to achieve economic reform (Zagré, 1994). 
Like other West African countries, Burkina Faso adopted the framework of the Bamako 
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Initiative (Ridde 2007). In the name of involving communities in their own health care, while 
relieving the state from the burden of social expenditures, this introduced user fees and cost-
recovery mechanisms together with responsibilities for those communities to manage existing 
health facilities. However, social change in rural areas, and the consequences of privatization, 
had impoverished large sections of the population, who were excluded from access to this 
official system of care.  
 
During the 1990s, community health mutual insurance schemes (mutuelles de santé) emerged 
as local responses to the problems of access and quality of health care. These take a variety of 
forms including mutual health insurance companies, assistance societies, insurance societies, 
specific prepayment schemes, mutual solidarity funds, professional mutual associations, and 
solidarity banks. Despite this diversity they share a common aim to assist poor and vulnerable 
groups to access adequate health care services. In theory, these schemes could potentially 
reach into the large informal workforce but in practice less than 1 per cent are covered. They 
have increased from 6 organizations in 1997 to 146 in 2005 (Ouédraogo 2012). Since 2000, 
the government, with the help of the International Labour Organization, has tried to support 
local mutual schemes to develop a network offering national coverage.2 Decree no. 2008-736 
of Feb 2009 established a Committee (Comité de Pilotage) to develop a National Health 
Insurance System like that in Ghana. The Universal Health Insurance system (Assurance 
Maladie Universelle –AMU), completed in 2015, rests on the foundation of the mutuelles de 
santé . There are also private commercial insurances (including SONAR, FONCIAS, UAB, 
GA, Colina Assurance), but they only cover a tiny privileged minority (Ouédraogo 2012).  
 
In structural terms, the position of people in need of health care in Burkina Faso has shifted 
from one where a minority were the beneficiaries of state-funded access to state organizations 
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providing allopathic treatment, while most were purchasing such care as they could afford in 
a market largely served by traditional healers. A small elite accessed allopathic medicine 
through a tiny private sector. It is not clear that the mutual insurance model has actually much 
enlarged the proportion of the population able to access allopathic services but it has shifted 
the costs of doing so. While rhetorically recasting patients as consumers, active agents in 
their choice of care, rather than beneficiaries, passive recipients of state provision, it has not 
necessarily altered their relationship with providers. For the social groups within mutual or 
private insurance schemes, most costs are still met by a third party whose decisions set the 
organizational and resource contexts within which their recognized providers operate. For the 
remainder of the population, out of pocket payments to the provider of choice continue to 
dominate. There are, then, very few sources of economic pressure on providers that might 
shape their occupational niche and what is considered to be appropriate behaviour within it.  
.  
The rise of private clinical practice 
The withdrawal of the state from health care funding has been paralleled by its withdrawal 
from direct provision. Private medical practice existed on a small scale in colonial times, 
mainly carried out by French military doctors alongside their official duties (Sawadogo 
2012). After independence, it remained a low-level activity until the 1980s (Haute-Volta 
1986). In 1991, there were 58 centres providing private health services. By 2009, however, 
this had increased to 380: about half of these were in Ouagadougou and a quarter in Bobo-
Dioulasso, the second biggest city (Ouédraogo 2010). The most urbanized part of the country, 
the central region, had at least 317 centres identified by the Ministry of Health, of which 118 
were pharmacies and 11 biomedical laboratories. The rest were health care centres. More 
than two thirds of these were private, about half being for-profit; 97 per cent of the private 
health centres were in the city. (Ministère de la Santé, 2010). Growth has since continued 
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more slowly but there were 407 private health centres in 2014, with 84 explicitly for-profit. 
(Ministère de la Santé 2015; Ouédraogo, 2010).  
 
The changing framework for the funding and provision of allopathic health care has, then 
created a context for medical practice that is somewhat more directly commercial, at least for 
those who use it. There is a chain of payment from consumers to third party payers who then 
contract with private providers or reimburse users for some proportion of their out of pocket 
expenses. Alongside this, as ever, is a large volume of traditional medicine that has always 
had an immediate economic connection to its users. While the healing work of Burkina Faso 
remains little changed, the institutional map laid over it has shifted considerably since the 
1980s. Allopathic medicine, in particular, is no longer delivered, to those who choose it, by a 
benevolent state through its employees. The ecological niche occupied by medical 
practitioners educated in a Western scientific tradition looks very different, although that 
occupied by traditional practitioners is little changed. What has this meant for practice?  
 
ECONOMIC CAPITAL VS SYMBOLIC CAPITAL: DOCTORS IN AN OPEN 
MARKET FOR HEALTH CARE  
In the immediate post-independence period, the medical profession had allied with the state 
to protect and expand its jurisdiction. The traditional sector was not directly attacked but was 
expected to decline as a better-educated population gained access to allopathic medicine. The 
1970 legislation that had delegated to the regulatory bodies governing the medical profession 
powers to promote traditional medicine only began to be implemented in 2006 (Ministère de 
la Santé 2006)3. The commitment to state provision had created a market shelter, which also 
provided a base from which to offer private services to a small elite patient group that shared 
the culture and values of the physicians. The medical profession traded on symbolic capital – 
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elite culture – to derive economic capital – state employment or patient fees. The state’s 
withdrawal from financing and provision undermined this shelter. In an open market, the 
doctors were competing with traditional practitioners, who derived their symbolic capital 
from their deep historical roots in the mass of the population, particularly in relation to their 
various ethnic and religious affiliations. The medical profession responded in three ways to 
protect its interests: it used its position in the state bureaucracy to maintain professional 
market regulation; it enforced these regulations against competing healers; and it promoted 
profit-seeking relationships with patients.  
  
The Crisis of the State and the Rise of Professional Control of the Health Care Field   
The autocratic character of government in Burkina Faso means it that it does not depend 
heavily on citizen goodwill as its source of sovereign power. This is not inconsistent with 
regular elections (Ottaway, 2003; Hilgers and Mazzocchetti , 2010; Politique Africaine, 
2006). As with all patrimonial power, the protection of the ruling elite, rather than that of the 
majority of the population, is the most important goal. On the other hand, the government’s 
power over the health professions is weaker than that over the general population. The state 
collects taxes from health professionals; it needs health experts to design its regulations; and 
its leaders are aware that an alliance between the health professions and the wider population 
is a potential threat. As has been pointed out in developed countries, there are 
interdependencies between states and professions (Rueschmeyer 1986; Halliday 1987; 
Johnson et al. 1995).  Since the colonial period, the Burkinabé medical profession has also 
become deeply embedded in the state’s administrative and technical institutions. However, 
this has brought them few material rewards, relative to those available to the political elite, 
despite being among the best-educated groups in the country. While the medical profession 
may have been privileged in some respects by its sheltered niche, it was not able to extract an 
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economic rent. The annual salary of a General Practitioner, for example, including all 
allowances and benefits, is less than 600 USD, equivalent to just one of the allowances4 paid 
to judges, who only require a Masters degree for their appointment (Bocoum et al. 2009)5. In 
one of their interviews a rural doctor compares his position to a tax inspector:  
…he is in (salary grade) A1 as a doctor, that's already abnormal. We should not be in 
the same category. His basic education is a master's degree, we have a doctorate and 
we are on the same footing. Which demotivates people from the start. When you see 
that you leave the college after 8-9 years of study and you come to see you have the 
same salary as someone who has only done 4 years, you are demotivated. (Bocoum et 
al 2009: 32) 
 
Contrary to the assumptions of the economic reformers, the withdrawal of the state from 
health care provision actually led to greater market control by the medical profession and a 
more substantial attempt to establish an effective monopoly. The profession attacked 
traditional healers with greater vigour, while using the decline of state oversight to direct and 
charge patients in self-interested ways (Code Public et Administratif 2000). In one of our 
interviews, a doctor explained that, apart from outpatient consultations which are fixed, the 
aim is to keep patients in hospital as long as possible. Each visit by a doctor to a hospitalized 
patient earns 6 USD; there are also daily charges for nursing care and the occupancy of the 
room. Medications provided by the clinic – rather than brought in - must be paid for on the 
day of discharge.  
 
Symbolic Capital and Interprofessional relationships 
The medical profession’s symbolic capital declined rapidly during the political turbulence of 
the 1980s and was not restored by the market reforms.  At the time of independence, 
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symbolic capital was derived largely from the profession’s association with the colonial 
regime as a form of imagined modernity. The small educated elite that established the new 
state identified with this future and saw doctors as agents for bringing it into being: indeed, 
the few African doctors in the country had often been involved in the liberation struggle and 
were as much involved in politics as in medical practice (Ouédraogo 2010). However, the 
profession was unable to develop cultural capital that would sustain the symbolic capital. Its 
knowledge base was derived from the problems of interest to the colonial power and was not 
renewed through a research system that might have connected to the problems experienced 
by the mass of the population. The French doctors who had served the colonial elite largely 
remained in place serving the new national elite until the end of the 1970s, when the practice 
of non-citizens was restricted. They were not fully replaced by African doctors until the 
1990s.  
 
The medical profession supplied the allopathic medicine demanded by the educated elite but 
did not develop its social capital by widening its networks through engagement with the 
culture of other groups within the society. The professional niche was, then, quite fragile and 
heavily dependent upon the support supplied by a particular elite group. Holders of medical 
degrees had a nominal legal monopoly of practice under a colonial decree of 1952, which was 
not replaced until 1970. There was some intermittent persecution of traditional healers, but 
there was little direct competition: each occupational group served a distinct market sector.   
 
Under the revolutionary regime (1983-1990), these boundaries were dismantled. In some 
respects, this can be compared with the Jacksonian abolition of professional guilds in the US 
during the 1830s (Kett 1968). Allopathic medicine was identified with the elite that had been 
overthrown and the regime effectively levelled the playing field to allow all kinds of healers 
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to flourish. The result was a significant shift in the balance of power between the occupations 
supplying healing services. In particular, pharmacists who were more numerous and 
dispersed across the country were able to ally with the regime and to take over key positions 
in the health ministry. The pharmacists had established a more pragmatic relationship with 
many traditional healers, as suppliers of the local pharmacopoeia alongside officially-
recognized medications, when available (cf. Patterson 2015 on neighbouring Senegal). They 
were able to expand their occupational niche by drawing on the social and cultural capital 
they had acquired through their deeper engagement with the population and their alliances 
with traditional practitioners.  
 
As the 1991 market reforms were extended to health care, the state withdrew from a direct 
role in the governance of the medical profession, establishing professional Orders, self-
governing associations with legal powers to regulate practice. These were designed on French 
models: in practice, much of the legal framework for health care still has its roots in colonial-
era decrees, which have just been cut and pasted into the new statutes. The implementation 
and operation of the Orders has had limited support from the profession, because of concerns 
about the ways in which this might affect their private interests. They have concentrated on 
those areas where there is agreement, like attacks on traditional practitioners, restraints on 
price competition for patients, and controls on referrals. Partly in response, traditional healers 
have been forming their own associations to defend their sphere of work and to set standards 
for practice. These have, for example, made an important contribution to enrolling traditional 
healers in networks for the identification of people who may have HIV/AIDS and referring 
them to treatment centres.  
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Since independence, then, the niche created for the Burkinabé medical profession by 
interactions between the occupational group, the state and the market has changed in 
significant ways. The close integration with the immediate post-independence state elite, 
based on shared symbolic capital has given way to a more distant relationship, where the 
profession is simply one among a group of competitors in a relatively open market. There is a 
sense that the state really does not care about the integrity of the medical profession: 
Those who work in the business sector are better paid because people think they are 
taking risks. The judges are well paid because that we think that justice is 
independent, so we must pay them so that they are not tempted to be corrupt. But 
none of these people can save another’s life. It's only the doctor who can save 
someone's life. I think doctors ought to be better paid because they take more risk. 
(Bocoum et al 2009: 32) 
The profession still enjoys some social and legal privileges, and a certain amount of symbolic 
capital through its international connections to development agencies and elements of the 
national elite. However, the result has been a closing of professional ranks to defend the 
niche through recognizably monopolistic practices rather than to enlarge it by a more 
expansive engagement with the society as a whole.  
 
The Commercialization of Doctor-Patient Relationships  
The lack of state oversight leaves the medical profession free to deal with its patients in ways 
that maximize its ability to accumulate economic capital within its niche. This involves a 
variety of behaviours from manipulating the boundary between public and private provision 
to outright fraud. Although the latter is rare, there are cases where doctors have directly 
embezzled public funds or collaborated with pharmacists to generate bogus prescriptions, 
with the reimbursements split between them.  
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More commonly, physicians exploit the interactions between private and public provision to 
their own advantage. Officially, private health centres are supposed to be professionally-led, 
but in practice the medical leadership is often a front for business interests, which have 
supplied the capital. One of our informants explained: ‘According to the regulations, if you 
are not a doctor you cannot open a clinic. So there are dummies, because doctors do not 
always have the necessary funds for this; but it is not to be spoken out officially.’ State–
employed doctors are theoretically forbidden from engaging in private practice – but many do 
so, as was the case in the colonial period. If they do not, they are quite likely to receive 
referral fees for directing patients from public to private provision. As one general 
practitioner told us: 
Even for complementary laboratory tests there are some who openly tell the patient to 
go to a given place. Yes! Last time I received a patient who told me that the doctor 
told him to go and do the tests at a specific place; that if he goes somewhere else he 
will not examine the results; I advised him to go and see another specialist.  
This is sustained by the manipulation of appointment systems and access to equipment. By 
limiting the number of appointments available in a public clinic, long delays for elective 
treatment can be induced and empty beds created because of the slow throughput: ‘… this is 
common. You go to the hospital, you are given an appointment within two to three months, 
especially in a specialty where there is only one practitioner. You are obliged to ask him/her 
in which clinic you can see him.’ These encourage patients towards the private sector, 
particularly for access to specialists. If hospital admission is required, the private sector can 
then take up the vacant beds, blocking them for other possible uses. (The private sector offers 
little provision for in-patient treatment). Public equipment may be deliberately disabled so 
that patients can only get access through a private centre. Over-treatment is common with 
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lengthy in-patient stays and collusion with pharmacists to order drugs that are only available 
privately, leading public hospitals to underestimate demand and to run short because supplies 
have not been purchased: ‘It’s simple: those who own the clinics work at the hospital; those 
who work in the clinics work at the hospital. It is the same people so they do not complain!’ 
 
These practices go unchallenged because other groups are co-opted to support them. The 
small-scale organization of private health centres limits the opportunities for other recognized 
health workers to share in the benefits of part-time employment there. However, means are 
found to compensate them for such tasks as ensuring that defective public equipment is not 
speedily repaired. Medical students are employed in the private health centres, although they 
are not authorised to work for remuneration. These other occupational groups acquire an 
interest in the status quo that is difficult to overturn: 
Globally less than two-thirds (62%) of the personnel of the EPS (Private Health 
Establishments) are salaried, about one third (30%) are part-time consultants and 8% 
are volunteers or interns. The proportion of those working part-time tends to be more 
significant for the most qualified categories of professionals (general practitioners and 
specialists). A significant number of them receive salaries from the public sector 
(Ministère de la Santé 2010:25).  
 Patients have few avenues for redress: it is almost impossible to find a doctor to act as an 
expert witness if a civil action is brought against a colleague. This collegial solidarity also 
limits the use of such sanctions as are available to the Order or to the health ministry. At best, 
a doctor may be relocated to a different area, where they are free to renew these practices, 
rather than risking their licence. A head of a hospital unit told us how he dealt with a 
colleague who was harming patients: ‘I fired him, I blew him off, I requested his relocation… 
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at first they did not do anything. And finally I asked to change the whole team, all the doctors 
at the same time…’ 
 
CONCLUSION 
Although the medical profession in Burkina Faso have been trained in programmes that are 
strongly influenced by European traditions, whether in Metropolitan France or in West 
Africa, there is little evidence to support the idea that this has cultivated a distinctive moral 
character that shapes the actions of most practitioners. As Sciulli pointed out in the passage 
we quoted earlier, there is no reason why actors in a market should not operate in an altruistic 
or selfless manner. Indeed, this would be entirely consistent with Adam Smith’s original 
understanding of the conditions for successfully functioning markets, and the place of 
professions within them. Self-interest is necessarily tempered by moral restraint and civic 
virtue, which may be symbolically rewarded, in the interests of winning the consent of all 
participants to the liberal social order (Winch 2009). In the bastardized version of Smith’s 
thinking represented by the market reforms of the SAP in Burkina Faso, these elements have 
disappeared: self-interest is all. As such the reforms have done little to affect the manners and 
morals of an authoritarian state. Within this context, there are no incentives, sanctions or 
other pressures that would lead doctors to act in any different way from any other market 
provider of goods or services. To the extent that there are remnants of the historic market 
shelter, these can be exploited for personal gain at the expense of competitors rather than 
being seen as an exchange for self-restraint.  
 
These findings contrast with Liu’s (2017) account of the Chinese legal profession, possibly 
because of the difference between the strength of the state apparatus for controlling 
professional behaviour. Although both states have an authoritarian character, Burkina Faso 
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lacks the institutional resources available in China to police the activities of professionals. 
They suggest the need to extend Liu’s four positions for professions in the ecology of 
development: as facilitators of global institutional diffusion; as delegates of the nation-state; 
as brokers between global and national market institutions; and as activists of local social 
resistance. In Burkina Faso, we seem to be seeing professionals as classic petty entrepreneurs 
with little pretension to any wider role. This leads us to echo the scepticism of the Chicago 
School about the degree to which professional practice can be shaped by attention to the 
moral character of physicians rather than to the structures within which they work. This is a 
theme that runs through the writings of Hughes (1984) and Becker (1970) but is perhaps most 
obvious in Freidson’s (1975) study of group practice, Doctoring Together. While this is not 
to dismiss the importance of education in ethics and social obligation during medical school, 
it is to note that these cannot be relied upon to shape practice in cultural or institutional 
environments that do not support these principles. ‘Professionalism’ conceived as an 
orientation to standards of work and a style of relationship with clients can only thrive in 
contexts that value it.  
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Endnotes
1 Very much in the Durkheimain tradition, Bourdieu associates capital with a structural model 
of social fields and habitus, a system of internalized dispositions. It is quite different from the 
interactionist tradition within which Freidson was writing, where structures were considered 
to be emergent from action, rather than prior, and where the idea that sociologists had access 
to internal mental states was, at best, problematic (Becker and Pessin 2006) . Unlike Liu and 
Emirbayer (2016), we do not see much value in attempting to reconcile positions based on 
such radically different epistemologies. Bourdieu’s typology of capital is adopted solely as a 
useful summary of dimensions that seem to be important to understanding the practical 
classification of occupations.  
2 This is a general trend in the region. As Ouédraogo notes: ‘A promising approach of many 
governments in sub-Saharan Africa is the extension of mutual health insurance schemes to 
the national level. Through their integration in public social security arrangements these 
national schemes can exploit the potential of MHIS and reach previously excluded population 
segments’ (Ouédraogo 2012:430). 
3 After the pressure from the revolutionary regime to develop traditional medicine, doctors 
returned to their own way of dealing with the sector, using technical and ethical argument to 
delay action. The Minister of Health declared: ‘We are no longer subjected to the passion of 
the early days which made us lose sight of the complexity of the problem (traditional 
medicine and pharmacopoeia). The possibility of making available Galenic forms such as 
syrup, creams, potions etc. no longer appear as an indisputable solution of our pharmaceutical 
policy. We are more and more conscious of the need to surround ourselves with the 
maximum possible guarantees concerning the efficacy and the innocuousness of medicinal 
recipes from plants. The action of promoting our traditional medicine and pharmacopoeia 
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should not lose sight of some of the problems of public health and medical ethics.’ (Comrade 
Elie Sarré Secretary of State for Social Action, 11/1987). 
4 Decree no2016-256/PRES/PM/MINEFID/MJDHPC regarding allowance grid, bonuses and 
benefits of all nature allocated to judges in office and to auditors of justice, provide in its 
Article 11 “judicature allowance” between 524.41 to 561.87 USD to judges according to the 
class.  
5 Following traditional European practice, the Master’s is a first degree in Burkina Faso. As 
in Europe it is now being replaced by the Bologna model of a shorter Bachelor’s degree 
followed by further study for the Master’s (normally 3 + 2 years of study).  
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